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PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM I:
CONSULTATIONS & DETERRENCE

Comments
WILLIAM

J.

DAVEY* AND AMELIA PORGES**

WILLIAM J. DAvEy: The requirement that disputing parties consult before
invoking the panel process in the WTO dispute settlement system is an important
part of the overall dispute settlement process. The following comments highlight
a number of issues and aspects of the consultation process that have arisen since
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.

I. Limited Secretariat Involvement
The WTO Secretariat has only limited involvement in the consultation process
and it is not present at the consultations. The Secretariat generally has no role
with the exception that one of the parties to the consultations may request the
Director-General to exercise his good offices in respect of the dispute.' In the case
of least-developed countries, explicit provisions are made for the involvement
of the Director-General if consultations fail.2 To the author's knowledge, the
Director-General has not had the occasion to be involved in the consultation
process to date.

*William J. Davey is Director, Legal Affairs Division, World Trade Organization. These comments
are strictly those of the author and should not be attributed to his employer, the Interim Commission
for the International Trade Organization, or any other organization for which it performs secretariat
services.
**Amelia Porges is Senior Counsel for Dispute Settlement of the USTR. The author wishes to
thank Scott Andersen, Jane Bradley, and Daniel Brinza for their helpful comments.
1. Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 5, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
2. Id. art. 24(2).
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II. Usefulness of Consultation
The consultation process seems to be useful in promoting settlements, as
roughly twenty percent of the requests for consultations appear to have resulted
in some form of settlement. With the commencement of the dispute settlement
process, countries are forced to consider their likelihood of prevailing if a dispute
goes to a panel and evaluate the costs and benefits of going through that process
if they expect to lose.
The usefulness of consultations, however, should not be overemphasized.
There remain considerable opportunities for delay in the WTO process. While
there are tight deadlines for the panel and appellate proceedings, these may be
exceeded. More significantly, despite these tight deadlines, the now-seeminglyaccepted standard of fifteen months as the reasonable period for implementation3
means that the final day of reckoning may be postponed in the dispute settlement
system for approximately two and one half years. There appear to be instances
where this potential for delay factors in Members' decisions to contest cases that
they probably expect to lose.
III. Problems Concerning Consultations
A number of issues have arisen concerning the consultation process that are
worthy of mention, although none of them impedes significantly the operation
of the dispute settlement system.
A.

MULTIPLE COMPLAINTS

In at least nineteen cases, more than one Member has individually complained
about a measure of another Member. In other cases, there have been joint consultation requests and/or joint panels. Some respondents in these cases have complained that such multiple requests put an inappropriate burden on them because
they may end up having to conduct essentially the same consultation several
times. This is a particular problem for Members with small delegations in Geneva.
While joint consultations may be a useful mechanism to use, they may be viewed
as undesirable from the respondent's point of view to the extent that they make
settlement negotiations with individual countries more difficult.
B.

JOINING CONSULTATIONS

In the case of consultations under GATT article XXII (or its analogous provision
in other WTO agreements), other Members with a substantial trade interest may

3. DSU article 21(3)(c) states that "a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable
period of time [for implementation] should not exceed 15 months." In the four cases to date where
it was necessary to set a reasonable period for implementation, fifteen months was twice agreed
upon by the parties and twice imposed by an arbitrator.
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request to join the consultations. 4 The decision on whether to allow this joinder
is in the hands of the respondent, who must agree that the request is well-founded.
While it has been argued that article 4.11 does not permit a Member that has
already requested consultations on its own to join in other consultations, this
reading of article 4.11 is contested.
The respondent decides alone if another Member may join consultations. Moreover, the respondent's control over who may join the consultations means that
it may allow other Members whose interests are aligned with the respondent to
join the consultations. The absence of control over the respondent's discretion
has led to complaints of abuse and "stacking" the consultations.
It has been argued, but it is not generally accepted at the moment, that a
Member who joins consultations under DSU article 4.11 should be able to request
a panel without requesting consultations itself. The inability to proceed directly
to a panel has led to procedural problems for the panel process. For example,
late-filing complainants have slowed down the progress of cases (e.g., Scallops,
Hormones) because it was necessary to incorporate the late-filed complaints in
the original panel proceeding.
C.

ADEQUACY OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS:

How

TO SUPERVISE?

Numerous complaints have arisen about the consultation process itself, as
demonstrated by the following examples. First, Members have questioned to
what extent the request for consultations and the consultations themselves must
include discussion of all issues that are subsequently raised in the panel process.
One can argue that since the consultation process is in part an information gathering process, the focus for defining what can be brought before a panel should
be the later document requesting a panel. However, totally ignoring how the
consultations are conducted could significantly undermine their role.
Second, Members have also raised the issue of whether failure to consult in
good faith during the consultation process is an enforceable obligation constituting
grounds for requiring the process to be restarted. A version of this argument
was rejected in Bananas III.
IV. Deterrence Effect of the New System-Too Early to Judge?
In this author's view, it is too early to judge whether the new system has
achieved a significant deterrent effect. To date, a number of cases, especially
some of the more controversial ones (e.g., Bananas, Hormones) have been holdovers from the GATT system. Hopefully, a deterrent effect will develop in the
future.

4. DSU, supra note 1, art. 4.11.
FALL 1998
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AMELIA PORGES: This comment lists a few relevant issues of the legal parameters of the consultation process from the standpoint of a government that is a
major user of the dispute settlement process.

I. Orientation
While much attention has been focused on panel and appellate proceedings
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), it goes without saying that litigation is not the only path
to settlement of disputes. As Elihu Lauterpacht said:
[i]t is an inescapable fact that issues that divide States are best settled by negotiation
and agreement. That is true whether the dispute is one that falls to be resolved within
the framework of existing law or is one of such novelty or proportions that a specifically
legislative effort is called for. The greater the direct involvement of the opposing parties
in the process of finding a solution to their differences, the greater the likelihood of
a satisfactory and lasting outcome. 5
Settlement by direct negotiation maximizes the control of a dispute by the
parties to that dispute. The governments that negotiated and agreed to the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) value party control, because they are sovereign
governments representing a variety of interests in a range of possible situations.6
The DSU supports this viewpoint, providing in article 3(7) that "[t]he aim of
the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.
A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the
covered agreements is to be preferred." 7 In addition, the Appellate Body stated
in the Wool Shirts case that "the basic aim of dispute settlement in the WTO is
to settle disputes." 8
On the other hand, as Professor Hudec remarked, enforcement in the GATT
happens only after the damage is done, and the value of dispute settlement as
enforcement is in getting governments to behave more lawfully from the beginning. 9 Government desire for rule-based dispute resolution rather than sui generis
conciliation has led to a search for consistency and predictability, increased professionalism, and more procedural formality-as seen in the DSU. The DSU

5. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 6
(1991).
6. Loss of party control in a dispute settlement process is also not in the interest of the forum
where the dispute is conducted, as it will lead eventually to the consumers of dispute settlement
abandoning that forum in favor of other fora.
7. Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.7, April
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
8. United States-MeasureAffecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts andBlousesfrom India,WT/
DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (visited June 24, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/online/ddf.htm>
[hereinafter WTO Website].
9. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 358-60 (1993).
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incorporates both settlement values and rule-compliance values at each step in
the process. At the consultation phase, settlement values are particularly strong.
While this panel session also addresses the issue of deterrence, deterrence of
unlawful behavior relates less to the consultation phase than to the speed and
credibility of the formal procedures that follow, including firm deadlines for
compliance. If it is indeed true that some Members (for instance, in cases involving
non-implementation of Uruguay Round commitments) have decided to contest
cases of flagrant violation purely to gain further delay, the remedy is not to tinker
with the consultation process. Rather, an arbitrator determining the "reasonable
period of time" for compliance under DSU article 21(3)(c) should take away
the benefits of delay and find that the particular circumstances call for immediate
compliance when faced with such behavior.
II. The Right to Ask for Consultations
Although the DSU now provides the "rules and procedures" for consultations,
the reasons for which consultations may be requested-the "causes of action"are part of the "consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements" referred to in DSU article 1(1). The GATT provides two separate
general-purpose consultation clauses: one for consultations concerning "any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement"under article XXII, and one for
consultations under article XXIII, in aid of "satisfactory adjustment" of legal
claims relating to nullification or impairment. During the era of the GATT 1947,
the Contracting Parties also created additional rights to ask for consultations and
duties to consult, concerning residual import restrictions, border tax adjustments,
liquidation of strategic stocks, and restrictive business practices. Some of the
Eastern European accession protocols also provide special consultation provisions. In addition, special-purpose consultation requirements exist under various
other provisions of the GATT and the WT0. 0
Each of these consultation requirements was created because it met a need at
the time. The right to get another government to discuss a matter it would rather
avoid should not be underestimated. It can be quite useful, particularly for smaller
countries whose need for dialogue might otherwise be ignored by the larger
players in the system.
A request for consultations in the WTO-now obligingly posted on the Internet
in three languages by the Secretariat-is often the first public sign of a dispute.
However, in the majority of cases, a formal request follows informal inquiries
through a government's missions abroad, informal contacts or informationgathering in the context of WTO committee work, or informal consultations in
the capitals of the governments concerned. A request for WTO consultations is

10. See ANALYTICAL INDEX
tation requirements).

(GUIDE TO

GATT

LAW AND PRACTICE)

619-21 (1995) (list of consul-
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not the only means for governments to discover relevant information or settle a
dispute, although it can be a useful tool and it is a necessary prerequisite to panel
proceedings.
III. The Ability to Kibitz Versus the Right to Be Alone
To resolve a deadlock over the handling of complaints concerning the trade
impact of the Treaty of Rome, the GATT agreed in 1958 that article XXII could
become a vehicle for plurilateral consultations. Any requests for consultations
under article XXII would be notified to the Secretariat and circulated for the
information of other contracting parties who could then be joined in the consultation if the target of the original consultation request agreed that the joining country
had a "substantial trade interest."" This procedure, including the "substantial
trade interest" standard, was incorporated unchanged into article 4(11) of the
DSU, which now applies not only to requests under GATT article XXII but to
requests under corresponding consultation provisions in the other WTO
agreements. " Under the WTO, some responding governments have accepted all
requests for participation under article 4(11). However, some have chosen to
refuse requests for such participation that do not present any evidence of substantial trade interest, or have refused requests where the nature of the interest was
irrelevant to the consultations (for instance, where consultations concern a particular import tariff-rate quota (TRQ) and a third country requests to participate not
because its exports are affected by the TRQ, but because it too has an import
TRQ on the product in question). The U.S. practice in requesting participation
under article 4(11) has been to cite trade data or other indicators of substantial
trade interest in the request.
No such option to kibitz has ever been created with respect to article XXIII;
if a request for consultations is framed under GATT article XXIII (or analogous
provisions in the other WTO agreements), the requesting government has the
right to consult alone with the respondent. Requests under article XXIII are also
notified to the Secretariat and circulated in the three WTO working languages,
but for information only. The ability to consult in private is important. Privacy
is usually more conducive to settlement; it may also be useful for a Member who

11. Procedures under Article XXII on Questions Affecting the Interests of a Number of Con-

tracting Parties, Nov. 10, 1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 24 (1959); see The Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 69-71 (1959) (in connection
with conclusion of examination of the Treaty of Rome).
12. These consultation provisions are listed by name in footnote 4 to the DSU. Such consultation
requests are translated and circulated in the three WTO working languages by the WTO Secretariat,
and any WTO Member other than the consulting Members that considers it has a "substantial trade
interest" in the consultations may request to be joined inthem; under DSU article 4.11 as interpreted
by the DSB, the deadline for such a request is ten calendar days after the date of circulation stated
on the WTO document or the next WTO working day, if the tenth day falls on a weekend or holiday.
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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believes-correctly or not-that another has discriminated against it as a result
of a bilateral agreement with a third party who would not be present. 13
At present, the choice between article XXII and article XXIII appears to be
dictated primarily by whether the requesting government wants to be alone with
the respondent or whether it wants to invite plurilateral participation in the consultations. However, in a number of cases in the past two years where the request
was addressed under article XXII (indicating that at least the requesting party
did not see privacy as essential), the respondent has denied claims of "substantial
trade interest" from parties who both expressed and had obvious substantial trade
interests, or accepted such claims only from parties likely to be sympathetic, or
denied participation by any WTO Member that had requested consultations in
its own right. This situation has occurred in spite of the fact that a rejected
would-be participant could have requested consultations on its own without demonstrating its trade interest, and can participate as a third party in a panel proceeding under DSU article 10 merely on the basis of a "substantial interest" (i.e.,
no trade interest required at all). There has been widespread frustration with this
anomalous result, which can only be explained as an unintended result of historical
convergence. 14
Before opening the door to any and all participation once a request has been
made under article XXII, it may be worth reflecting on where the WTO dispute
settlement system as a whole is headed-i. e., the system as it is reflects an
ecological balance between settlement values and enforcement values. Settlement
values support the complainant or respondent who wants to have a private discussion without kibitzers; enforcement values support the quasi-working-party approach of plurilateral article XXII consultations. The costs and benefits of any
change need to be carefully considered. In the end, the historical trend may
overwhelmingly favor enforcement over settlement, particularly where it is clear
that a respondent's exclusion of parties from article XXII consultations is not in
aid of settlement but purely for obstruction and delay. However, WTO dispute

13. See, e.g., Korea-Laws, Regulations and Practicesin the Telecommunications Sector, WT/
DS40/1 (Oct. 29, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 8 (complaints by EC on telecommunications
procurement).
14. The "substantial trade interest" requirement in the 1958 procedures for article XXII was
insisted upon by the EEC; the EEC knew it would be the target for the first round of plurilateral
article XXII consultations on the Treaty's impact on trade in various commodities. See discussion
of origins of 1958 procedures in 2 AMELIA PORGES ET AL., ANALYTICAL INDEX, 612-13 (6th ed.
1995) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL INDEX], and list of consultations at 623. The "substantial interest"
requirement for third party participation in the panel process is completely independent in origin,
and dates from the Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 213 & 217-18 (1980) ( 15 & Annex
6(iv)); the first "third parties" to participate in panels were Australia (complaining party, in the
EEC-Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed
Fruits and Vegetables, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 68 (1979) and various banana and citrus
producing countries also interested in the United Kingdom-Dollar Area Quotas, GATT B.I.S.D.
(20th Supp.) at 236 (1974).
FALL 1998
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settlement has to include the option for governments to consult in private as
is now provided under article XXIII. Governments that need privacy will talk
privately, whether they do so in the WTO or in some other forum.
IV. The Duty to Consult
With the right to request consultations goes the duty to consult, as provided
in the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the GATT and the other
covered agreements as well as article 4(2) of the DSU itself. In the WTO dispute
on Desiccated Coconut, the defending party, Brazil, refused to consult with the
complaining party, the Philippines. The panel report makes it clear that the duty
to consult is itself enforceable under the DSU:
[t]he Philippine's request [for a ruling on Brazil's refusal to consult] concerns a matter
which this Panel views with the utmost seriousness. Compliance with the fundamental
obligation of WTO Members to enter into consultations where a request is made under
the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute settlement system. Article 4.2 of the
DSU ... [and DSU Article 4.6] make clear that Members' duty to consult is absolute,5
and is not susceptible to the prior imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member.'
If the request for a panel finding on this issue had not been outside the panel's
terms of reference, the panel clearly would have ruled that Brazil's refusal violated
the DSU rules.
Outright refusals to consult have been extraordinary. The few instances in the
GATT usually involved consultation requests involving political matters. The
United States refused to consult with Nicaragua when Nicaragua challenged the
U.S. trade embargo in 1985; the EC refused to consult with Yugoslavia concerning EC trade sanctions in 1991.16 A few instances in the WTO have concerned
matters of internal political sensitivity. When the United States requested consultations in early 1997 with Ireland and the UK concerning customs reclassification
of high-technology products, both responded by referring to a letter from the
EC stating that "consultations will not be entered into." The issue involved was
the division of competences between the Community and its member states in
trade in goods. When India, Hong Kong, and Thailand each requested consultations with Turkey concerning Turkish textile restrictions imposed in connection
with the EC/Turkey customs union, Turkey failed to appear, reportedly due to
institutional concerns expressed by the Community relating to the EC's role in
the measures at issue.R7

15. Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R,
WTO Website, supra note 8.

16. See

ANALYTICAL INDEX,

287 (Oct. 17, 1996), at

supra note 10, at 672-73.

17. See Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/1, WT/
DS29/l, WT/DS47/1, WT/DS34/2, at WTO Website, supra note 8 (complaints by India, Hong
Kong, and Thailand and panel request by India).
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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V. Consultation as a Prerequisite
Article XXIII:2 of the GATT provides for referral of a complaint to the Contracting Parties only "if no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time." This provision has been
customarily construed as a requirement that before a panel request can be made
under article XXIII:2 concerning a matter, and certainly before a panel can
consider that matter, the matter must have been the subject of consultations under
article XXIII: 1 or article XXII: 1 that have not resulted in settlement. 8 The major
exception 9 has been when the target of a consultation request refused to consult
or refused to consult on a timely basis. The precedent for establishing a panel
in such a situation was set in the 1985 Nicaraguan embargo case. 20
This theme is not unique to the world of GATT/WTO dispute settlement. For
example, dispute settlement provisions of other agreements of the same vintage
as the GATT, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), also provide for third-party settlement of
disputes that have not first been settled by negotiation. The 1928 General Act
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes provides for conciliation of
disputes "which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy." 2' Consultations
are a very important means of focusing the dispute and setting up the case to
facilitate the panel's work, similar to the role of pre-trial conferences between
parties to domestic litigation.
Therefore, consultations have an important function in giving notice to defendants, providing a chance to settle in the manner that maximizes party control (by
negotiation), resolving uncertainties about the scope and nature of the measures at
issue, eliminating fruitless or invalid claims, and making it possible to present
a case in shape for a panel to do its work. Panels can encourage this function
by requiring that the consultation requirement in the DSU be satisfied before
hearing the dispute. This does not mean that panels must determine that all
possibilities of amicable settlement have been exhausted, or that they must evaluate the quality of interaction in consultations. As the panel in Bananas III found
in rejecting a similar argument made by the EC:

18. See ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 10, at 672-74; the use of article XXII: 1 as satisfying

the consultation prerequisite was accepted at least as far back as the 1950s, and was provided for
in the Havana Charter negotiations. Id. Changes in the subject matter trigger a requirement to consult
concerning the changed measures. For instance, during the panel proceeding in the second Tuna!

Dolphin case, Congress amended the statutes at issue. The complaining parties then requested and
carried out another round of consultations on the statutes as changed, before obtaining the agreement

of the United States and the panel to include the changed statute in the ongoing panel proceeding.
19. The other exception is for complaints under article XXIII: I(c); although there have been
panel requests under article XXIII: I(c), no such panel has ever been established.
20. United States-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, C/M/192, at WTO Website, supra
note 8.
21. Sept. 26, 1928, art. 1, 93 L.N.T.S. 343.
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[clonsultations are

. . .

a matter reserved for the parties. The DSB is not involved; no

panel is involved; and the consultations are held in the absence of the Secretariat. In
these circumstances, we are not in a position to evaluate the consultation process in
order to determine if it functioned in a particular way. While a mutually agreed solution
is to be preferred, in some cases it is not possible for parties to agree upon one. In
those cases, it is our view that the function ofa panel is only to ascertain that consultations,
if required, were in fact held or, at least, requested. 22
The fact that an issue was included in the request for consultations is prima
facie evidence that notice was provided and it was discussed. However, a party
cannot be expected to know all the claims it will present before it draws up its
consultation request. Certainly if a matter is actually discussed in consultations,
as demonstrated by records or copies of statements made at the consultations, the
purpose of the consultation requirement has been met and it should be admissible at
the panel stage.
Professor Davey has raised the question of whether one Member's consultation
request can be used as the legitimate basis for a panel request by a different
Member or Members. Such an interpretation would contradict the reference in
the text of GATT article XXIII:2 to "satisfactory adjustment

. . .

between the

contractingparties concerned, -23 and practice under the GATT and the WTO
since 1948 has not recognized the legitimacy of a panel request by a party that
did not ask for consultations in its own right. This issue also raises the possibility of
tipping the dispute settlement system toward a quasi-working-party enforcement
model, and would require negotiating governments to reflect carefully on the
possible consequences.
VI. What Happens in Consultations
A typical consultation lasts no longer than two to three hours and takes place
in a small WTO meeting room or a Geneva mission. Consultations are generally
conducted in English with no interpreters, no transcript, and no taping. Participants are usually delegates from the Geneva missions of the parties, and may
include representatives from their capitals depending on the importance of the
dispute, the travel time to Geneva, and the interest of the parties in substantive
negotiations as opposed to simple completion of the necessary formalities before
a panel process. Where other Members have been joined in the consultations
under DSU article 4(11), their representatives may also attend. Otherwise, the
consultations are private and closed to other WTO Members and the public.
Consultations may focus on written questions. Sometimes the questions seek
factual information or copies of relevant laws, regulations, administrative notices,

22. European Communities-Regimeforthelmportation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, WT/
DS27/R/USA, 7.19 (May 22, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 8.
23. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (emphasis added).
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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or other documents; sometimes they seek to explore legal theories. Our experience
has been that governments in the position of responding to a consultation request
have been reluctant to provide substantive answers to legal questions, particularly
where it is clear that the dispute is heading to a panel. However, constructive
dialogue on the factual issues has been more frequent, especially where the responding government believes it can resolve the dispute or at least some of the
claims by removing factual or legal misconceptions. A close examination of the
record of WTO disputes shows that a significant number of disputes are simply
not pursued after the consultation stage.
As the other speakers have noted, under the WTO a remarkably high number
of complaints have been settled successfully in consultations. Even in those cases
that are not settled and are subsequently referred to a panel, consultations can
have a major impact; the exchange of information can lead the complaining party
to eliminate claims, and lead to a better-presented, more sharply argued case
that makes the panel's job easier.
Yet there are cases where the souffle does not rise. For instance, a complaining
party may present a questionnaire loaded with demands for self-incriminating
answers, and these questions may then receive totally circumspect responses.
Or, for whatever reasons, the respondent may refuse to provide answers, or its
story may change at the last minute. How can the complaining party deal with
this situation?
The recent Appellate Body report in the India Mailbox case is instructive in
this respect. The United States presented written questions during the consultation
to India seeking factual information on the existence of an administrative system
for receiving "mailbox" patent applications. India declined to answer the questions. At the panel stage, India relied on the novel assertion that India had actually
implemented its TRIPS obligations through unpublished administrative guidance.
The United States reacted to this new factual assertion at the panel stage by
making a new, contingent claim that if such a mechanism existed, its unpublished
nature was in violation of the TRIPS Agreement. The panel decided to consider
that claim and made a finding against India in the alternative, which India then
appealed.
The Appellate Body held that even though India failed to disclose its argument
in consultations, the panel was not justified in reacting by unilaterally extending
its own terms of reference to be able to deal with the new U.S. claim in the
same panel proceeding. However, they then issued the following appeal to WTO
disputants:
[a~ll parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forthcoming
from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts
relating to those claims. Claims must be stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely.
This must be so in consultations as well as in the more formal setting of panel proceedings. In fact, the demands ofdue process that are implicit in the DSU make this especially
necessary during consultations. For the claims that are made and the facts that are
established during consultations do much to shape the substance and the scope of subseFALL 1998
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quent panel proceedings. If, in the aftermath of consultations, any party believes that
all the pertinent facts relating to a claim are, for any reason, not before the panel, then
24
that party should ask the panel in that case to engage in additional fact-finding.
Obviously, the Appellate Body cannot legislate new rights and duties in the
consultation process beyond those already provided in the DSU. However, if
the responding party refuses to provide answers to questions in consultations,
the complaining party can make its claims and request fact-finding by the panel.
As a practical matter, any answer not provided to a party in consultations can
certainly be requested by a panel, and if a party does not respond to a panel
question the panel is likely to draw its own conclusions.
QUESTION AND

ANSWER SUMMARY: The question arose as to the role of the

private practitioner in the dispute settlement procedure. Gary Horlick responded
that the private practitioner today may be involved in every phase of dispute
settlement, from consultation to argument before a panel. Typically, a private
practitioner will be hired by a government or by the interested private industry.
A government with minimal resources and no WTO expertise may seek the
assistance of a private practitioner.
Horlick commented that a private practitioner representing a government in
WTO dispute settlement is well advised to think like a government. Since a
government may be a plaintiff one day and a defendant the next, it is important
that a private lawyer not advise the government to do something it does not
want done to it at some later date. The potential role for private practitioners is
particularly great in light of the fast pace of WTO dispute settlement, a pace
about twice as fast as under the GATT.
Responding to another quesiton, Horlick stated that the rule under the DSU
is that panels should look only to their terms of reference in deciding which
issues to address and which not to address, and should not look to what the parties
may or may not have discussed in consultations. If a party wishes to stonewall,
that's its right. But, if it refuses to participate in consultations at all, it risks
having a panel called eleven days after the request for consultations is made.
And, if the party stonewalls during consultations, it risks having the complaining
party ask for very broad terms of reference.
Kenneth Reisenfeld, referring to proposed settlements in the U.S.-HelmsBurton dispute and the U.S. -Textile Rules of Origin dispute, asked about the
terms of those proposed settlements and the likelihood of Congress implementing
their terms. Horlick responded that in the case of U.S. -Helms-Burton, Congress
would have to waive title IV of the Act. In the case of U.S.-Textile Rules of
Origin, Congress would have to change the rules of origin applicable to silk
scarves from France and Italy. There is no constitutional impediment to either
24. India-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/
DS50/AB/R, 94 (Dec. 19, 1997), at WTO Website, supra note 8.
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action, but Horlick declined to comment on the likelihood of either happening.
Amelia Porges responded that in the Textiles dispute, it is possible that the proposed settlement requires only the submission of legislation to Congress, as opposed to the actual enactment of legislation by Congress. Horlick commented
that if the EU has agreed to a settlement of the Textiles dispute, whereby legislation
simply would have to be submitted to Congress, then essentially a political dispute
would be defused by papering it over. Of course, he added, "the paper may
come undone."
The question was posed about how to respond if a party is not forthcoming
with a key document during consultations. Porges responded that a panel will
not automatically draw a negative inference from a party's failure to turn over
a key document to its adversary. She pointed to the recently decided ArgentinaApparel case, in which Argentina declined to turn over to the United States certain
customs invoices. The panel did not draw a negative inference from Argentina's
conduct in that case. If a defending party fails to cooperate by producing documents requested by the complaining party, the complaining party may ask the
panel to reiterate the request. In stonewalling, a defending party risks having to
comply with a request by the panel.
Horlick commented that this illustrates why consultations are not the right
forum in which to conduct discovery. A defending party may use consultations
to highlight favorable facts without putting forward all of the facts. It may put
forward facts intended to show the complaining party why it will lose. A panel
is needed to run discovery, in order to draw out the truth of the matter, without
the spin that parties are likely to put on the facts during consultations. Porges
added that in putting forward facts during consultations, a defending party may
attempt to show that its own circumstances are not unlike circumstances in the
complaining country.
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